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Nontechnical Summary
Centralization in the public sector is often regarded as an unfavorable and hard-
to-avoid tendency in the course of economic development associated with inef-
ficient government expansion. Nevertheless, restraining the federal level comes
at a cost, if federal government activities are important for a country’s ability
to coordinate public sector activities. This seems particularly relevant within
the context of economic integration among local and state jurisdictions as, for
instance, in the case of European integration. As emphasized in the literature
on fiscal federalism, there are certain government functions where the effect of
a government’s policy decision is not confined to its own jurisdiction. Instead,
in presence of high mobility of goods and factors, local policy decisions might
exert external effects on other jurisdictions and the efficient supply of public
services requires coordination among local and state governments. Possibly, but
not necessarily, coordination of policies is achieved by the assignment of respon-
sibilities to a central institution. From this perspective, it seems reasonable to
argue that public sector centralization could be an important precondition and
a driving force of economic growth. In order to empirically explore the role of
(de-)centralization for growth this study focuses on the historical record of Ger-
many from its foundation as a federal country in the 19th century to the present
day.
The hypothesis of a stimulating impact of centralization on growth is laid out
in a theoretical model emphasizing the role of benefit spillovers from public
inputs between lower level governments. It turns out that as compared to a
setting without coordination among governments, a central planner’s solution
would imply an increase in spending on federal public goods which benefits
productivity and, under certain conditions, the rate of productivity growth.
To explore the link between economic growth and the vertical structure of the
public sector empirically, two related, but distinct, approaches are employed.
First, to assess the quantitative development over the long range, the analysis
hypothetically assumes that at the time of its foundation, Germany displayed
an inefficient, decentral structure of the public sector. With this presumption
the analysis asks whether the development is consistent with a beneficial role of
centralization. This is done by comparing the development of the public sector in
terms of size and vertical structure with the development of productivity growth.
A review of the development of the public sector, and, in particular, of the share
of federal government expenditures, as an indicator of the share of federal goods
supplied, in fact documents a significant secular – although stepwise – process of
centralization from Germany’s foundation until the 1970’s. At the same time a
significant increase in total factor productivity growth is indicated from growth
accounting. A co-movement of productivity growth and centralization is also
suggested by an inspection of specific policy areas, which are commonly regarded
as playing a particularly important role for productivity growth. Whereas in
the area of science and education the federal expenditure share still remained
small, until the 1970’s public expenditures on transport and communication have
been incurred increasingly by the federal level. Hence, although the descriptive
evidence is not revealing the direction of causation, it can be stated that the
pattern in the development of the public sector and of productivity is consistent
with a stimulating impact of centralization on economic growth.
A second, more analytical approach, then, explores whether in fact the devel-
opment of the federal system over the course of time has led to an efficient
vertical structure with regard to productivity growth. More specifically, it asks
whether in modern, post-war Germany a different vertical structure would have
contributed to higher growth. The results of the regression analysis confirm
a significant positive impact of the federal expenditure share on productivity
growth after World War II. This suggests that a higher share of federal expendi-
tures or, respectively, a smaller share of the state level, would have led to even
higher rates of productivity growth.
Since fiscal federalism in Germany after World War II is characterized by com-
plex connections between governments at all fiscal tiers, a higher share of federal
public goods supplied may not only be brought about by higher federal expen-
ditures but also by means of coordination among jurisdictions. As the analysis
nonetheless shows a positive significance of federal government expenditures or,
respectively, a negative significance of state government expenditures, it, there-
fore, indicates that the coordination of policies among state level governments
as part of the cooperative federalism is not efficient with regard to productivity
growth. Indeed, the negative impact found for the state level expenditures might
be interpreted as an indication that the role of the state level in the German
system of fiscal federalism is inefficient.
Of course, by focusing on efficiency with regard to productivity the current study
has excluded many other possible government objectives. If state governments
as compared to the federal government are more involved with the provision of
public services other than public inputs, the current vertical division of respon-
sibilities might well be efficient with respect to other objectives. However, given
frequent criticism about disincentives of the German system of fiscal federalism,
it seems nevertheless important to state that, whatever the objectives are, ac-
cording to the empirical results the current structure of the public sector entails
cost in the sense of foregone productivity growth.
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1 Introduction
Centralization in the public sector is often regarded as an unfavorable and hardly
avoidable tendency in the course of economic development associated with the
rise of the Leviathan or, less dramatically, with the increase in the overall in-
efficiency of the decision-making process in the public sector. The federalism
literature emphasizes the importance of enforcing a more decentralized public
sector, where several policy decisions are taken by local or state jurisdictions.
By fostering learning processes, competition, and variety among the individual
states decentralization will certainly have its merits, and the decentralization
of the public sector might help to limit inefficient government expansion (Bren-
nan and Buchanan, 1980). Nevertheless, restraining the federal level comes at
a cost, if federal government activities are important for a country’s ability to
coordinate public sector activities.
This seems particularly relevant within the context of economic integration
among local and state jurisdictions as, for instance, in the case of European
integration. As emphasized in the literature on fiscal federalism (e.g., Oates,
1972), there are certain government functions where the effect of a government’s
policy decision is not confined to its own jurisdiction. Instead, in presence of
high mobility of goods and factors, local policy decisions might exert external
effects on other jurisdictions and the efficient supply of public services requires
coordination among local and state governments. Possibly, but not necessarily,
coordination of policies is achieved by the assignment of responsibilities to a
central institution.
From this perspective, it seems reasonable to argue that public sector centraliza-
tion could be an important precondition and a driving force of economic growth
in the context of the European integration. Since, if the provision of public
services exerts positive impacts on productivity and productivity growth (e.g.,
Aschauer 1989, Barro, 1990), one could think of an optimal vertical structure of
the public sector which maximizes growth (e.g., Davoodi and Zou, 1998, and Xie
et al., 1999). Of course, even an ideal public sector may have objectives other
than raising productivity, and other considerations as for example to restrain the
Leviathan will be important for the design of a federal system. But, if it could be
shown that a different vertical structure of the public sector would yield higher
productivity growth, it seems nevertheless legitimate to acknowledge foregone
productivity growth.
In order to empirically explore the role of (de-)centralization for growth this
paper focuses on the German experience. Despite substantial difficulties due
to historical discontinuities and lack of data, it takes a long-term perspective
from the formation of Germany as a federal state to the present day. The basic
reason to include the early period into the analysis is to put the hypothesis of a
beneficial role of centralization on productivity and growth in a historical con-
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text. Especially, the comparison with the observed long-run development will
help to point out the explanatory content and the limits of the theoretical argu-
ment of an impact of the vertical structure of the government on productivity
and growth. Moreover, in the early period, Germany evolved from a collection
of loosely connected states to an integrated economy where a significant role
of centralized policies seems particularly likely. As the early Germany expe-
rienced significant growth at least in its industrial production, it is tempting
to assume that the government has played an important role in economic de-
velopment (Bowen, 1950). There are also striking fiscal parallels between the
ongoing process of European integration and the integration process that formed
Germany as a unified country. Like in 19th century Germany, tax authority in
the EU remains largely with the states. Only tariff revenues belong to the EU
as the central level, as was the case in pre–1914 Germany. Also, the struggle
for the fiscal transfers of the member states to the EU budget has its historical
antecedents in the early times of unified Germany, with its debate over the ”Ma-
trikularbeitra¨ge”. Although there are notable political differences, the economic
parallels between the German and the European integration process suggest that
a broad view on the German experience might contribute to the discussion of
the role of central government activities for economic development and growth.
To explore the link between economic growth and the vertical structure of the
public sector, the study employs two related, but distinct, approaches. To assess
the quantitative development over the long range, the analysis hypothetically
assumes that initially, i.e. at the time of its foundation, Germany displayed an
inefficient, decentral structure of the public sector. With this presumption the
analysis asks whether the development is consistent with a beneficial role of
centralization. This is done by comparing the development of the public sec-
tor in terms of size and vertical structure with the development of productivity
growth. In this regard, the analysis not only considers total expenditure but
also the development in specific areas which are particularly concerned with the
provision of public inputs, as for instance the public provision of transport and
communication infrastructure. A second more analytical approach, then, ex-
plores whether in fact the development of the federal system over the course of
time has led to an efficient vertical structure with regard to productivity growth.
More specifically, it asks whether in modern, post-war Germany a different ver-
tical structure would have contributed to higher growth. The results found are
consistent with a positive role of centralization for productivity growth and sug-
gest that a smaller budget share of the state level would actually have benefited
overall growth in post-war Germany.
The paper proceeds as follows. The following section lays out the basic hypoth-
esis of a stimulating impact of public sector coordination on growth. Section 3
provides a description of the public sector size and centralization in Germany
beginning with its foundation in the 19th century and confronts this with the
development of productivity growth. Moreover, subsections focus on the de-
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velopment in the areas of transport and communication as well as science and
education, functions of government which may be particularly relevant for pro-
ductivity. Section 4 focuses on the period after World War II and relates cen-
tralization with productivity growth in a regression analysis. Finally, section 5
provides the conclusions.
2 Public inputs, coordination, and productivity growth
This section puts forward the argument that policy coordination may help to
foster productivity and productivity growth in a highly stylized theoretical model
of two jurisdictions. Following standard practice in the literature productivity is
described using a macroeconomic production function relating output to factor
input. Assuming a function of Cobb-Douglas type per capita output y at location
i is
yi = Pik
α
i , (1)
where ki denotes the capital intensity and Pi denotes total factor productivity
(TFP). It reflects “the current state of technology used in producing the goods
and services of an economy” (Griliches, 1998) and is in the following assumed
to be affected by the supply of public services.
2.1 A local public good
Consider the case of a local public good, which affects local productivity in a
factor-augmenting fashion (Barro, 1990)
Pi = Ag
γ
i , (2)
where A denotes total factor productivity irrespective of public spending and gi
denotes per capita spending on the local public good. In a general setting we
would have to take account of an impact of current as well as past government
spending on current productivity pointing to a role of the accumulated stock of
public capital. But whereas this would complicate the analysis it would not alter
the results, qualitatively, as long as the productivity effect of public expenditures
is limited and public capital depreciates over time. Hence, we assume that the
level of public input supply is determined by current expenditures. If public
expenditures are financed by a tax on value added, in the absence of debt, the
budget constraint relates spending to tax revenue
τiyi = gi, (3)
3
Figure 1: Steady-state equilibrium
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where τi is the tax rate. Assuming that firms treat the productivity impact of
public inputs parametrically, i.e. that they do not take into account the global
productivity impact of their decisions via the public budget, the after tax rate of
return on capital is equal to its marginal product net of taxes and depreciation
ri = α (1− τi)Pikα−1i − δ, (4)
where δ denotes the rate of depreciation. Solving equations (1),(2), and (3) for
the supply of public inputs and inserting into (4) we obtain
ri = (1− τi)αA 11−γk
α+γ−1
1−γ
i τ
γ
1−γ
i − δ. (5)
Accordingly, the rate of return varies with the capital intensity and the tax rate
depending on the parameters of the production function. If the productivity
impact of public inputs is small, γ < 1 − α, the rate of return declines with
capital intensity. Capital accumulation of the economy then contributes to a
decline in the rate of return and, consequently, saving and investment become
less attractive over time. In the end, the economy approaches a steady state
with a constant capital intensity where the rate of return just equals the rate of
time preference.
The determination of the long-run conditions of the economy is depicted in Fig-
ure 1. The horizontal axis indicates the value of capital intensity. The negatively
sloped line (a − a) represents the value of the rate of return corresponding to
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a given capital intensity. The long-run equilibrium is determined by the inter-
section with the horizontal line reflecting the rate of time preference ρ. The
long-run capital intensity is kai .
An upward shift of the rate of return (b− b) results in a higher steady-state level
of the capital intensity kbi . And, although the net rate of return is unchanged,
the overall capital income is increased. Hence, a policy which aims at maximiz-
ing capital income will shift out the locus of the rate of return to the largest
possible extent. Of course, it seems questionable to assume that the government
maximizes capital income. But, in the current setting with a Cobb-Douglas
production function, this is equivalent to maximizing overall income and con-
sumption.1 Therefore, a policy aimed at maximizing income or consumption
will set the tax rate at a level which shifts out the locus of the rate of return
as far as possible. Formally, we can derive the optimal policy by differentiation
of equation (5) with respect to the tax rate. As in the analysis of Barro (1990)
the optimal policy consists of a choice of the tax rate equal to the elasticity of
output with respect to public inputs
τi
!
= γ. (8)
Accordingly, the tax rate is set higher, if the impact of public spending on
productivity is stronger. Without this impact, the tax rate would be zero.
2.2 A federal public good
Consider a case with two different public goods, a local and a “federal” public
good. The former affects productivity only locally whereas the latter exerts
significant benefit spillovers across local jurisdictions, formally
Pi = Ag
γ
i f
µϕ
i f
(1−µ)ϕ
j , 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1, (9)
where gi captures spending on the local public good as above, and fi is local
spending on the federal public good. fj denotes spending on the federal good
by jurisdiction j. With the overall productivity effect of the federal public good
denoted by ϕ, the contribution of the individual jurisdiction’s supply is deter-
1Note that (per-capita) consumption ci is given by net income exclusive of depreciation
ci = (1− τi)Pikαi − δki. (6)
Solving for Pi, inserting into equation (4), and setting the rate of interest to ρ we obtain(
ρ+ δ
α
− δ
)
= ci. (7)
Accordingly, in the steady state consumption is proportional to the stock of capital.
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mined by µ. As is shown in the following the existence of benefit spillovers gives
rise to inefficient government policies.2
In case of uncoordinated policies, local policy at jurisdiction i determines the
level of spending as well as the budget share of its own supply of the federal
public good
θiτiyi = fi, (10)
(1− θi) τiyi = gi, (11)
where τi is the local tax rate and θi is the budget share of the federal public
good. The after tax rate of return on capital is
ri = α (1− τi)Agγi fµϕi f (1−µ)ϕj kα−1i − δ. (12)
Replacing fi and gi using (10), (11), (1), and (9) the rate of return can be
expressed as a function of the capital intensity (ki), the tax rate (τi), the budget
share (θi) of the federal good, as well as of the spending on the federal good (fj)
by the other jurisdiction.
ri = α (1− τi)
[
A(1+γ+µϕ)k
−(1−α−γ−µϕ)
i f
(1−µ)ϕ
j τ
(γ+µϕ)
i (1− θi)γ θµϕi
] 1
1−γ−µϕ − δ.(13)
Without policy coordination the local government is assumed to choose its policy
conditional on the spending decision of the other jurisdiction.3 Keeping the
assumption that each jurisdiction aims at maximizing the steady state level of
income generated at its location, the policy of a local jurisdiction can be derived
by differentiation of the rate of return ri with respect to τi and the spending
share θi
τi
!
= µϕ+ γ, (14)
θi
!
=
µϕ
µϕ+ γ
. (15)
As above, spending on the local good (gi) is at the efficient level of γyi. With
µϕ > 0 the tax rate is set higher than γ in order to finance spending on the federal
good as well. The lower is µ the stronger are spillover effects from the federal
public good, and, consequently, the lower is spending, despite of the fact that the
overall productivity effect is fixed at ϕ. This reflects the basic inefficiency from
2Note that in difference to tax and expenditure competition models with local public inputs (e.g., Zodrow
and Mieskowski, 1986, and Seitz, 1994) the inefficiency arises from benefit spillovers not from the mobility of the
tax base.
3As in the case of interjurisdictional competition (Seitz, 1994: 80ff.) local governments could alternatively
be assumed to decide upon their policy conditional on the chosen policy parameters of jurisdiction j (τj , θj).
Nevertheless, even with this alternative specification the decentralized setting with benefit spillovers would remain
inefficient.
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local provision of the federal good: each local government neglects the beneficial
impact on the other jurisdiction’s productivity.
In this situation the jurisdictions would benefit from policy coordination. An
efficient outcome is achieved by a central planner who simultaneously determines
the per capita amount of federal and local public goods supplied in each of the
two identical jurisdictions. Given the symmetry of the model, the supply of
public inputs now is determined by a uniform tax rate and a uniform share of
local public inputs
θτyi = fi, (16)
(1− θ) τyi = gi. (17)
With the same tax rate and the same share of local public inputs also the value
of the capital stock ki = kj and the overall productivity Pi = Pj are identical
across jurisdictions. Consequently, the central planner maximizes ri (and simul-
taneously rj) at a given stock of capital by choosing τ and θ in the function
ri = α (1− τ)
[
A(1+γ+ϕ)k
−(1−α−γ−ϕ)
i τ
(γ+ϕ) (1− θ)γ θϕ
] 1
1−γ−ϕ − δ. (18)
The first order conditions for a maximum rate of return are
θ
!
=
ϕ
ϕ+ γ
, (19)
τ
!
= ϕ+ γ. (20)
Again, the income share of spending on the local good is at a level of γ. But,
the tax rate and also the share of spending on the federal public good are higher
than in the decentral setting. Note that the policy parameters chosen are no
longer affected by the benefit spillovers. As the intuition suggests, it can be
shown that the rate of return is increased relative to the decentralized setting.4
In terms of Figure 1, this implies that the central planner’s policy shifts out the
locus of the rate of return relative to the policy of uncoordinated jurisdictions
and thus brings about an increase in the steady state level of capital.
4The two solutions can be compared by inserting the corresponding policy parameters into equation (18).
Denoting the rate of return in the central planner’s and in the decentralized setting with rci and r
d
i , respectively,
at each value of the capital intensity the ratio of the (gross) rate of returns is given by
rci + δ
rdi + δ
=
(
1− γ − ϕ
1− γ − µϕ
)
µ
−ϕ
1−γ−ϕ .
This expression equals unity at µ = 1, and is decreasing in µ. Consequently, with significant benefit spillovers
µ < 1 the central planner’s solution yields a higher rate of return.
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2.3 Steady state growth
The preceding analysis has assumed that in the long-run accumulation of capital
comes to an end, as the rate of return declines in the value of capital. However,
Barro (1990) uses the model of section 2.1 to show that, provided the produc-
tivity of public inputs is strong enough, public sector activity may generate
sustained growth in the economy. In the model with the federal good this would
be the case, if
α + γ + ϕ = 1. (21)
Then, as can be seen from equation (18) the rate of return is no longer decreasing
in capital. In fact, the rate of return becomes independent of the stock of capital.
And, if the rate of return is higher than the rate of time preference ρ, it would
always be beneficial to increase the stock of capital in order to increase future
earnings.
The optimal policy will be the same, irrespective of whether there is unlimited
growth. The only difference is that the policy is not maximizing the level of
consumption in the steady state but its rate of growth. Formally, with the pa-
rameter restriction (21) the rate of growth is obtained from the familiar Ramsey
rule (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995)
cˆi = (1/η) (ri − ρ) ,
where cˆi denotes the rate of change of (per capita) consumption and η denotes
the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption. Assuming that η is con-
stant,5 the above reasoning to determine policies, by assuming that the local
governments or the central planner maximize the rate of return, can be directly
applied as well to the maximization of the rate of growth of consumption. Con-
sequently, we can state that the rate of growth in the decentralized setting is
smaller than that achieved by the central planner.
However, the possibility of sustained growth has sort of a knife-edge character
(Solow, 1994), since a small deviation from the above parameter condition yields
a petering out of the growth process, or, to the contrary, an explosion of growth.
Although, one might think of an evolutionary process which over the course of
history leads to a selection in the sense that less efficient federal designs are given
up or disappear, possibly no such mechanism is available to prevent parameter
constellations which are explosive. Nevertheless, despite of the strong assump-
tion about the production elasticities of public and private inputs, growth models
of this type actually form the basis of empirical studies aimed at assessing the
efficiency of the composition of the public sector with respect to productivity
growth. Deverajan et al. (1996) consider the role of the composition of the public
5This is equivalent to assuming a constant intertemporal elasticity of consumption.
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sector with respect to different functions of government. Davoudi and Zou focus
on the vertical composition, i.e. on the role of (de)-centralization using data for
several countries. Finally, Xie et al. (1999) analyze the role of centralization
among the US. states. Also, note that with limited time periods available for
empirical analysis the issue of whether an observed secular increase in produc-
tivity should be regarded as an adjustment towards a new, higher, steady state
level of productivity, or, alternatively, as evidence for a continuous process of
productivity increases cannot be finally resolved by means of an empirical ana-
lysis, anyway. Therefore, we follow the literature and focus on the relationship
between productivity growth and centralization.
2.4 Empirical implications
The theoretical discussion suggests that centralization may contribute to pro-
ductivity growth in the presence of public goods which have an impact on pro-
ductivity and exert spillover effects between jurisdictions. As uncoordinated
policies imply an inefficiently low supply of those “federal” public inputs, pro-
ductivity gains are achieved by a central planner, who raises the supply of such
public goods. Formally, the previous section gives rise to a relationship between
productivity growth, the total public budget, and the overall spending share of
the federal good
P̂ = Â+ β1T + β2Θ, (22)
where P̂ denotes the rate of productivity growth, Â is the autonomous level of
growth, T denotes the income share of total public spending, and Θ is the budget
share of expenditures on the federal good. A positive coefficient β2 indicates that
a higher share of federal goods would stimulate productivity growth. A negative
coefficient suggests that productivity growth would benefit from a reduction of
the share of federal goods. In order to derive empirical implications it is essential
to make a statement about the policy, as the sign of the two indicators of public
sector activities depends on whether or not the size and structure of the public
sector equals the central planner’s solution (indexed with C), formally
T R TC ⇒ β1 Q 0, and Θ R ΘC ⇒ β2 Q 0.
Suppose size and structure of the public sector are efficient, and there are only
small perturbations. Then, there should be no significant relationship between
both the level of expenditures and the degree of centralization on the one hand
and productivity growth on the other hand, since there is no room for improve-
ments. Thus, following Davoodi and Zou (1998) as well as Xie et al. (1999)
an estimation of the relationship in equation (22) can be used to test for the
efficiency of the vertical structure of the public sector with respect to produc-
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tivity growth. A negative coefficient β2 would be interpreted as an indication of
a too high spending share for the federal good, whereas, conversely, a positive
coefficient points to a too low share of spending on the federal good.
Two distinct, although related, empirical implications can be drawn depending
on the initial situation. Assuming that the initial situation of Germany at the
time of its foundation in the 19th century is characterized by an inefficient,
decentralized setting (T < TC ,Θ < ΘC), an expansion of the public sector
together with centralization should be accompanied with an increase in the rate
of productivity growth over time. Moreover, as not all public spending is equally
important for productivity, specific policy areas, more closely related to the
provision of public inputs, should play a particular prominent role in the process
of centralization and government expansion.
This descriptive view on the relationship between productivity growth and the
public sector is related to Popitz (1927) who argues that there is a clear tendency
towards centralization of the public sector in the process of economic develop-
ment. Among other factors which contribute to an increased role of the central
government Popitz explicitly mentions economic integration.6 However, because
Popitz mixes normative and positive perspectives on the development of the
public sector, it is not obvious as to what extent he considers a centralization of
the public sector as the source for increased productivity growth. But, at least,
his discussion suggests that insufficient centralization in the public sector would
harm the economic development.
In the later stages of the German federation, it seems difficult to still assume
that the initial situation is characterized by a decentralized setting. Instead,
the second approach explores whether the development of the federal system
over the course of time has led to an efficient vertical structure with regard
to productivity growth. More specifically, it uses an empirical estimate of the
parameters of equation (22) to infer whether in modern, post-war Germany a
different vertical structure would have yielded higher growth.
As the supply of federal goods is difficult to measure, the budget share of the
federal government – for simplicity denoted as the “degree of centralization” – is
used in the following as a proxy variable for the share of federal goods supplied.
There are of course many limitations of this approach. First, as evident already
from the theoretical model, federal public goods need not necessarily be supplied
by the federal level. And, second, the federal level need not necessarily confine
itself to the supply of federal goods. In fact, as argued by Popitz (1927), in a
process of economic development and integration the division line between local
and federal public goods will become less clear-cut. Moreover, in the presence
of intergovernmental grants and revenue sharing, the vertical structure in terms
6“Die Entwicklung des Deutschen Reiches [...] zeigt, [...] daß eine einheitliche Wirtschaft auf dem Gebiete
des Rechts und der Gewerbefo¨rderung zum mindesten gemeinsame Gesetzgebung voraussetzt [...]” (Popitz, 1927:
347).
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of expenditures is not always indicative of the vertical structure in the decision
making process behind public expenditures (Blankart, 1999a). And, finally, ex-
penditure figures fail to capture the extent of legislative and regulatory activities
of governments (e.g., Zimmermann, 1973). However, using the share of federal
government expenditures as a measure of the provision of federal goods has the
definite advantage of being operational. As we do not see a reasonable alter-
native we will use the budget share in the following, keeping in mind that this
indicator can be misleading and needs to be complemented in some cases with
a discussion of legislative activities and specific features of the federal decision
making process.
3 Public sector development and productivity growth
In order to discuss the underlying development of public sector growth and
centralization from the formation of Germany as a unified state in the 19th
century to the present day, this section examines the development of the public
sector in general as well as differentiated with regard to fiscal tiers and contrasts
this development with the rate of productivity growth. To provide a quantitative
picture of the development of the public sector, we assembled data from a variety
of sources. In particular for the pre-World War II period, we draw from existing
studies by Andic and Veverka (1963), Hoffmann (1965), Weitzel (1968), and
Recktenwald (1962, 1975). A detailed description of sources is provided in the
appendix.
3.1 Overall development of the public sector
Figure 2 plots the ratio of total public expenditures without social insurance as
percentage of net national product at market prices (NNP).7 As there are no
data available for the periods around World War I and II the development is
decomposed in three periods: pre-1914, interwar, and post-1950. With regard
to the first period, the development of the public sector is characterized by
a stagnation in the 1850’s and early 1860’s. During the struggle for German
unification until 1871 we see some significant fluctuations, but after unification,
there is a relatively steady, if not rapid, expansion. From a minimum at 7.1% in
1856, the share of total public expenditures as a percentage of NNP more than
doubled to 14.8% in 1913.
The second period after World War I takes off with significantly higher public
spending, which demonstrates the “displacement effect” of wars (Peacock and
7The data for total public expenditures are based on calculations from Hoffmann (1965), Statistisches Bun-
desamt (1991b), and Sachversta¨ndigenrat (1998), see appendix.
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Figure 2: Public sector growth in Germany, 1850-1997
Public expenditures relative to net national product at market prices
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Wiseman, 1961). By far the biggest and most rapid increase of the public sector’s
share occurred during the short inter-war period from 1925 to 1938. The share
of total public expenditures as percentage of NNP rose within only 13 years from
20.8% in 1925 to 34.4% in 1938. Including social insurance, Andic and Veverka
(1963) even report an increase of the public sector’s share to 42.5% in 1938. In
order to explain this extraordinary expansion of the public sector, three factors
seem to play a crucial role. First, there is a remarkable regular rise in public
expenditures regarding education, housing, and social affairs (even without so-
cial insurance) due to the formation of a comprehensive welfare system during
the Weimar Republic. Second, then, war-related expenditures are responsible
for a second, irregular increase of public expenditures. At the beginning of the
Weimar Republic war damage compensation in accordance with the treaty of
Versailles amounted to more than 10% of total public expenditures (Statistis-
ches Bundesamt, 1972). Later on, Nazi Germany started its remilitarization and
military expenditures are a major driving force of public spending (Andic and
Veverka, 1963). Third, finally, the business cycle partly explains this pattern
of public sector growth. Whereas, in consequence of the Great Depression from
1929 to 1932, the national product actually declined, public expenditures re-
mained mostly at their high levels, or even increased as, for example, in the case
of welfare expenditures.
In the immediate post-World War II period, in difference to the displacement
effect of World War I, the ratio of public expenditures to NNP started with
a level of 26.1% in 1950 which is slightly lower than the pre-Nazi level (1933:
28.4%). The sixties are characterized by significant growth up to 31.0% in 1970,
and, corresponding to the change towards a Social and Liberal Democratic gov-
ernment in 1969, there is another sharp increase of public expenditures to a peak
of 38.3% in 1982. Following the change of government in 1982 there is a small
decline in the public sector’s share to 34.0% in 1989. However, after German
re-unification in 1990, additional public spending concerning the reconstruction
of East Germany led again to an increase of the public sector size to 37.6% in
1993 and a modest decline thereafter.8
In conclusion, the general trend from the middle of the nineteenth century to the
present day indicates an increase of the public sector share by almost five times
during the past 150 years: from an average of 8% for 1850-65 to an average of
nearly 38% in 1992-97.
3.2 Allocation of expenditures by fiscal tiers
A quantitative examination of the development in the vertical structure of the
public sector faces serious difficulties, in particular regarding the period until
8Due to the inclusion of the debt of the East German economy in the public sector the figure for 1995 is
suppressed.
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1913.9 Figure 3 only reports five observations in the early period (see also the
corresponding Table 1). With this qualification, the federal level’s share seems
to have remained rather stable with 29.3% in 1881 and 27.8% in 1913. But, as
depicted in Table 1, there is a significant increase of the spending at the local
level, i.e. of the municipalities. Tilly (1997) notes that municipal government
expenditures, especially driven by investment activity, grew clearly faster than
the national product during this period. Legler et al. (1988) find a similar
increase of local spending towards the end of the 19th century in the U.S., arguing
that this gain in local spending reflects the process of urbanization. Nevertheless,
this period shows a gradual gain in importance of the federal relative to the
state level, as there is a strong decline of the state level’s share of total public
expenditures (without social insurance) from 44.4% in 1881 to 35.5% in 1913,
whereas the federal share more or less remained constant.
After World War I, the federal level starts with a much higher budget share,
which, again, is related to the displacement effect of wars (Peacock andWiseman,
1961). The Weimar Constitution transferred a number of expenditure functions
from the state to the federal level, and it also introduced new expenditures on
social assistance and education which were previously assigned to the local level
(Laufer and Mu¨nch, 1997). Nevertheless, in the Weimar period the increase in
the relative size of the local level continued, as its expenditure share increased
from 36.9% in 1925 to 41.1% in 1932. The development of the budget share of
the other fiscal tiers shows no clear pattern: the state level’s share of total public
expenditures first declined from 27.8% in 1925 to 24.0% in 1930, and then rose
again to 26.8% in 1932. The federal level expanded from 35.3% in 1925 to 38.3%
in 1930, and afterwards fell to 32.0% in 1932. With the beginning of the Nazi
period in 1933, Germany ceased to be a federal system. With remilitarization
and the consolidation of the La¨nder (“Gleichschaltung” ), increasingly crucial
public expenditures were allocated to the central level. As Andic and Veverka
(1963) suggest, the federal government’s share of total public expenditures made
up as much as 75.9% in 1938.
The third period from 1950 to 1997 starts with a substantially higher share of
federal expenditures as compared to the pre-Nazi period. In addition, we see
a significant positive jump in the scale and share of state level expenditures
(see Table 1). Moreover, the state level share also shows a continuous increase
during the whole period until 1990. In contrast to the inter-war and pre-1914
periods, this points to a decentralization trend in expenditures, indicative of a
fiscal re-emergence of the state level in this later stage of German federalism.10
9Although the Reichsschatzamt (1908) provides in its ”Denkschriftenband” data for some single years, it is
important to note that these figures are only of limited use and reliability, since the local level is not adequately
taken into account. In order to give a rough indication, we use the estimates of Andic and Veverka (1963). For
the post-World War II period, data according to the Finanzstatistik from the Statistisches Bundesamt (1972,
1998b) are employed. For more details, see appendix.
10Note that the apparent degree of centralization on the expenditure side does not take account of the low
fiscal autonomy at the revenue side of the states’ budget, see below.
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Figure 3: Centralization in the public sector in Germany, 1881-1997
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Table 1: Allocation of public expenditures by fiscal tiers in Germany, 1881-1997
Period Federal State Local Sumd
gov. gov. gov.
% NNPa shareb % NNP share % NNP share % NNP
1881 3.09 29.34 4.68 44.39 2.77 26.27 10.54
1891 3.91 30.37 5.52 42.86 3.45 26.77 12.88
1901 3.94 28.16 5.53 39.52 4.53 32.32 14.01
1907 4.19 27.95 5.35 35.68 5.45 36.37 14.99
1913 4.60 27.81 5.88 35.53 6.07 36.66 16.55
1881-1913 3.58c 28.73 5.39 39.60 4.45 31.68 13.79
1925-1932 8.41 35.92 6.02 25.73 9.01 38.36 23.44
1933-1937 13.21 52.84 4.60 18.42 7.17 28.73 24.98
1925-1937 10.26 42.43 5.47 22.92 8.30 34.65 24.03
1950-1973 16.42 49.32 10.18 30.61 6.67 20.07 33.27
1974-1990 16.50 44.63 12.84 34.75 7.62 20.61 36.96
1950-1990 16.46 47.38 11.28 32.33 7.06 20.30 34.80
1992-1997 17.01 44.36 13.37 34.89 7.96 20.75 38.34
Note: a) Net national product at market prices. b) As percentage of total public expenditure without social
insurance and payments to the EU. c) The calculation of the average uses continuous data. d) Because of
differences between national and financial accounts not equivalent to the total expenditure series in section 3.1
and in Table 2.
Whereas the federal level’s share of total public expenditures decreased from its
peak of 54.5% in 1951 to 45.0% in 1990 and 43.3% in 1997, the state level’s
share rose from 27.8% in 1951 to 34.1% in 1990 and 36.6 % in 1997. The local
level, too, increased its share from 17.8% in 1951 to 20.9% in 1990 and 20.1% in
1997. Nonetheless, in comparison to its pre-World War II share, the local level
remained relatively weak (cf. Blankart, 1999b).
Altogether, the figures indicate a secular increase of the federal expenditure share
in Germany. Rather than showing a monotonous pattern, the development is
characterized by stepwise increases corresponding to changes in the political
system (Recktenwald, 1975: 745ff). However, the sequence of increases in the
federal expenditure share has come to an end in the post-World War II period,
more specifically in the 1970’s.
3.3 Expenditures on transport and communication
As public expenditures on transport and communication may help to encourage
mobility and interaction between jurisdictions, this area is particularly important
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Table 2: Public expenditures for education, science, transport and communica-
tion in Germany, 1881-1997
Period Transport & Education & Total Exp.
Communication Science
Exp. State Fed. Exp. State Fed. Exp. State Fed.
lev. gov. gov. lev. gov. gov. lev. gov. gov.
% NNPa shareb share % NNP share share % NNP share share
1881 1.06 - - 1.64 - - 10.59 44.39 29.34
1891 1.36 - - 1.72 - - 12.31 42.86 30.37
1901 1.28c - - 2.18 - - 13.43 39.52 28.16
1907 1.45c - - 2.17 - - 13.51 35.68 27.95
1913 1.60 29.78 6.21 2.63 37.47 0.17 14.81 35.53 27.81
1881-1913 1.35 - - 1.96e - - 12.34e 39.60 28.73
1925-1932 1.73 17.97 15.15 3.44 55.11 0.22 24.97 25.73 35.92
1933-1937 2.96d - - 2.91 - - 29.52 18.42 52.84
1925-1937 2.07d - - 3.24 - - 26.72 22.92 42.43
1950-1973 2.26 30.07 36.11 3.47 63.38 7.84 28.50 30.61 49.32
1974-1990 2.06 29.34 46.06 5.96 69.71 13.72 36.19 34.75 44.63
1950-1990 2.18 29.77 40.24 4.50 66.01 10.28 31.69 32.33 47.38
1992-1997 1.59 28.35 46.11 6.05 70.07 10.63 37.55 34.89 44.36
Note: a) Net national product at market prices. b) As percentage of total public expenditure without social
insurance and payments to the EU. c) Interpolations based on Weitzel (1968). d) Data are only available for
1925-35. e) The calculation of the average uses continuous data.
for exploring the relationship between centralization and productivity growth.
Whereas the overall pattern of development is depicted in the Figures 2 and 3,
Table 2 lists numbers on the level of spending as well as the share of the state
and federal levels.11 Total public expenditures on transport and communication
as a percentage of NNP amounted only to 1.1% in 1881, and increased to 1.6%
in 1913. After World War I, the level of transport expenditures relative to NNP
increased slightly to 2.1% in 1927, and declined in consequence of the Great
Depression to 1.5% in 1932. Despite a lack of reliable data for the Nazi period,
one might speculate about a rise in transport expenditures after 1933.12 Starting
from a level as low as 1.4% in 1950 transport and communication expenditures
more than doubled in 20 years to a peak of 3.0% in 1971. Afterwards, they
11The data are taken from Weitzel (1968) and Statistisches Bundesamt (1972, 1998b). For more details, see
the appendix. More historical details on the role of the public sector in the area of transport and communication
and further bibliographical references are provided by Tilly (1976) and Borchardt (1976).
12Indeed, Hoffmann’s (1965) figures on net investments on roads also suggest such an increase for the post-1933
period. This is consistent with the enforced expansion of the road network as part of the Nazi’s war preparations.
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declined to just 1.4% in 1997 – a level as low as in the 1950s, and even lower than
during the inter-war period. This relative decline of public expenditure in the
area of transport and communication is probably due to the fact that the large-
scale construction of basic infrastructure had been accomplished by this time,
as well as to privatizations of large parts of the transport and communication
infrastructure, and, finally, it might be caused by the EU’s new role in these
infrastructure projects.13
With regard to the allocation of transport and communication expenditures by
fiscal tiers the data exhibit a significant centralization process (cf. Albers, 1964).
The federal level’s share of total transport and communication expenditures rose
from 6.2% in 1913 to 16.0% in 1925. After a short decline to 12.6% in 1929,
it increased again to 18.7% in 1932. During the post-World War II period, the
federal level’s share expanded rapidly from 30.2% in 1950 to a peak of 50.4%
in 1976. Although the federal level’s share subsequently decreased to 42.8% in
1997, it remained still fairly high. As depicted in Table 2, the state level’s share,
in contrast, declined from 29.8% in 1913 to 20.5% in 1925, and even only 16.8%
in 1932. After World War II, the state level’s share rose again to its pre-World
War I level of 32.8% in 1950. Afterwards, however, it witnessed a minor decline
to 29.3% in 1997. With a share of 64.0%, the local level was by far the most
important fiscal tier regarding transport spending in 1913. Local authorities
thus played a significant role during the process of industrialization, especially
from 1897 to 1912, by providing public infrastructure (Tilly, 1997). This role was
then quickly taken over by the state and, in particular, the federal level. After
rising to its absolute peak of 69.7% in 1929, the local level’s share thus declined
to 64.5% in 1932, and just 37.0% in 1950. Subsequently, it even dropped to
21.3% in 1975, remaining more or less at this low level until reaching 27.9% in
1997.
But beyond this leading role of the federal level in transport and communica-
tion expenditures after World War II, policy coordination could have further
contributed to an increase in federal public goods and thereby stimulated pro-
ductivity growth. Particularly with regard to transport, joint public activities
(“Gemeinschaftsaufgaben”), formally defined in Article 91 of the Grundgesetz,
represent an important aspect of policy coordination.14 In addition, the regula-
tive powers of the federal level might have a dominant position in the transport
and communication sector. Likewise, the EU exercises now significant regulative
powers in this area (Majone, 1994).
13For the Europeanization of public expenditures, see Schmidt (1999).
14For more details, see Laufer and Mu¨nch 1997.
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3.4 Expenditures on education and science
Although there might be possible substitution effects with private education,
the level and vertical structure of government activities in the area of educa-
tion and science might be important for economic growth as well. With factor
mobility public efforts to improve education will exert benefit spillovers across
jurisdictions and, hence, coordination could benefit policy effectiveness. Sim-
ilarly, with significant economic integration productivity effects of science and
research activities will not be confined to individual states. However, it should
be noted that as the benefit from learning processes, competition, and variety
among institutions might be particularly strong in this field, central planning
and egalitarian policies which are often related to centralization could lead to
serious inefficiencies.
With regard to the overall development, total public expenditures on science
and education as a percentage of NNP grew steadily during the pre-1914 period
from 1.0% in 1861 to 2.6% in 1913.15 Together with the expenditure increase
this period saw a modernization and extension of the public school system, and,
particularly in the last two decades until 1914 universities and newly founded
technical schools and other publicly supported research institutes experienced
an upswing. With the further extension of compulsory education and the public
school system and with the introduction of public financial aid schemes for edu-
cation in the Weimar Republic, the ratio of science and education expenditures
rose to 3.8% in 1931. After the Nazis came to power, however, this expansion
was followed by a sharp decline to 2.6% in 1937.16
In the post-World War II period, science and education expenditures started
from a lower level as compared to the Weimar Republic. With only 2.3% in
1950, the ratio of science and education expenditures as a percentage of NNP
was thus as low as in 1908. From this low starting point, then, science and
education expenditures almost tripled in 25 years and grew to 6.6% in 1975,
reflecting governmental initiatives to promote secondary and tertiary education.
Yet, after reaching a second peak of 6.4% in 1981, the ratio of science and
education expenditures again declined to 4.9% in 1991. Only due to additional
spending in relation to German reunification in 1990, finally, the share of public
expenditures on science and education increased again to 6.0% in 1997. This
general pattern of development is found also for the relative share within the total
public budget. The area of education and science thus more than doubled its
share within the public budget from 7.3% in 1950 to 17.3% in 1974. Afterwards,
this share declined steadily to 13.8% in 1991. After a short post-reunification
15The data are taken from Hoffmann (1965) and Statistisches Bundesamt (1972, 1998b). For more details, see
the appendix. An alternative data source on research and science expenditures is provided by Pfetsch (1974,
1982). Despite of some unresolved interpretation problems, these data broadly fit with the figures present here.
16For a detailed historical perspective on public sector activities in the area of education and science, see Conze
(1976) and Pfetsch (1974).
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increase of education expenditures, it is reported with 16.4% in 1997.
The federal expenditure share in the area of education and science is difficult to
capture before 1913. From 1913 to 1932 the federal level’s share of education and
science expenditures remained at a low level of about 0.2%. After World War
II, there is a centralization process, as the federal level’s share reached a first
peak of 13.7% in 1961. Growing subsequently only slowly to 14.7% in 1991, it
declined again to 9.6% in 1997. Thus, in purely quantitative expenditure terms,
the federal level remained quite weak in the area of education and science. A
more rapid growth pattern can be observed for the state level’s share. Starting
from 37.5% in 1913, it increased to 58.3% in 1932. For the post-World War
II period, the state level’s share increased even further from 61.0% in 1950 to
71.6% in 1997. In contrast, local education and science expenditures declined
dramatically. From 62.5% in 1913, the local level’s share of total education and
science expenditures decreased to 41.5% in 1932. Afterwards, the local level’s
involvement in education and science was furthermore reduced from 36.9% in
1950 to just 15.3% in 1991, increasing only slightly to 18.8% in 1997.
In accordance with the constitutional assignment (“Kulturhoheit der La¨nder”),
the state level clearly emerged as the most important fiscal tier in charge of
education and science expenditures. After 1871, education policy in Germany
continued to be the domain of the states. However, this state level responsibility
has always been counterbalanced by policy coordination. First attempts of coor-
dinating university policies were established at a common university conference
at ministerial level as early as 1898. Today, there exists with the “Kultusminis-
terkonferenz” (KMK) a powerful body of all state governments aiming to coordi-
nate numerous matters of education policy. Moreover, with the aim of coordinat-
ing education policy between the federal and the state level, the “Bund-La¨nder-
Kommission fu¨r Bildungsplanung und gemeinsame Forschungsfo¨rderung” (BLK)
establishes another means of policy coordination and joint legislation, regulation
and financing in the area of education and science.17
3.5 Centralization and productivity growth
To contrast the development of the public sector with productivity growth, this
subsection reports figures obtained from a standard growth accounting procedure
which measures the rate of change of total factor productivity (TFP). Leaving
a discussion of the method and the data sources to the appendix, the results are
summarized in Table 3.
Accordingly, the average growth of the net domestic product in constant prices18
17For more details, see Laufer and Mu¨nch (1997).
18For the period 1850-1937 the net domestic product is employed, since only this is available in constant prices.
After 1950 the growth accounting uses the net national product. See the appendix, for more details.
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Table 3: Growth accounting for Germany, 1850-1997
Source Productiona Capital Labor TFP
1850-1870 2.09 0.49 0.43 1.17
(100) (23.3) (20.9) (55.8)
1871-1913 2.92 0.77 0.78 1.37
(100) (26.4) (26.7) (46.9)
1925-1937 3.12 1.14b -0.02 2.01
(100) (36.5) (-0.7) (64.2)
1950-1973 6.14 2.12 0.84 3.17
(100) (34.6) (13.7) (51.7)
1974-1990 2.14 0.81 -0.20 1.53
(100) (37.9) (-9.6) (71.6)
1992-1997 0.94 0.72 -1.24 1.46
(100) (76.8) (-131.7) (154.9)
Note: Percentage points in growth rate (per cent of production growth rate). a) Net domestic product or net
national product at factor costs, see the appendix. b) The rate of capacity utilization of capital, as calculated by
Mester (1961), is taken into account.
before the unification of 1871 is distributed among capital with 0.5%, labor with
0.4% (decomposed in employment 0.5%, and working hours -0.1%) and TFP with
1.2%. Between 1871 and 1913 TFP growth increased and amounted to 1.4% on
average. With regard to the inter-war period, due to its shortness, large fluctu-
ations, and economic crisis, it seems particularly difficult to distinguish a clear
trend in productivity and to compare the growth record with preceding or follow-
ing periods. Nonetheless, there is some indication of high productivity growth
on average. Taking the utilization rate of capital into account TFP growth is
calculated at 2.0%. The post-World War II period is characterized by unprece-
dented high economic and productivity growth, which especially in the imme-
diate post-war period is related to the “catching-up” effect (e.g., Abramovitz,
1986, Maddison, 1996, van Ark and Crafts, 1996). Following standard practice19
the total period until reunification is decomposed into the years before and after
the first oil price shock in 1973/74. The growth accounting yields high produc-
tivity growth of 3.2% until 1973, followed by a period of much weaker growth
with only 1.5% on average. The period after reunification, considered separately,
reports again a growth rate of TFP at 1.5%.
Although there are differences in methodology and data, the overall picture of
the development of productivity growth is largely consistent with other studies
(e.g., Hoffmann, 1965, Hesse and Gahlen, 1965, and Andre, 1971, for the pre-1914
time, and Christensen et al., 1980, Dougherty, 1991, and Maddison, 1995, for
the post-1950 time). However, because of the general methodological problems
the present results should be regarded as upper limits for the rate of technical
19See the studies on economic growth, as, e.g., Maddison (1995, 1996), or Christensen et al. (1980).
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progress (see appendix).
All in all, with the exception of the period after the Oil Crisis, the figures show
an average increase in the rates of productivity growth across the different pe-
riods: after Germany’s foundation productivity growth increased. Moreover, in
comparison with the pre-1914 Germany, the subsequent inter-war period showed
even higher growth rates and the first two decades after World War II report the
strongest growth. At the same time, the earlier inspection of the public sector
development has revealed a significant expansion of the public sector together
with a stepwise increase in the federal expenditure share. However, the central-
ization process has come to an end and has even been reversed in the 1970’s,
seemingly coinciding with the decrease in productivity growth. Although one
should be cautious not to interpret this coincidence as causality, it should be
noted that it is consistent with a significant role of the vertical structure of the
public sector for economic growth, especially since the quantitative differences
in the structure of the public sector are of significant magnitude.
The development in the two specific policy areas partly supports the conformity
between centralization and productivity growth. In particular the area of trans-
port and communication fits well into the picture of federally provided public
inputs stimulating economic development and growth in a historical perspec-
tive whereas the federal expenditure share in the area of science and education
showed only a small increase after World War II.
However, as already pointed out, budget or expenditure shares are imperfect
indicators of the share of federal goods supplied, especially, since federal leg-
islation and regulation activities as well as policy coordination among levels of
government are not captured. In particular the pre-1914 period shows important
legislative federal government activities, which are only weakly related to public
expenditures. Even if first attempts to unify currencies, to harmonize legisla-
tions and standards, and to coordinate politics have been undertaken before, the
unification of 1871 certainly marked the most important step. The monetary
reform and the introduction of the Mark as a single currency in 1871/76, the
complete unification of the different weights and measures, the introduction of
a common patent law in 1877 and the protection of intellectual property played
undoubtedly a significant role for the economic development. Moreover, the in-
troduction of the Civil Right (“Bu¨rgerliches Gesetzbuch”) and the Commercial
Right (“Handelsgesetzbuch”) in 1900 marked a milestone in establishing legal
support of commerce and trade. In addition, competition control was legally es-
tablished in 1909. However, even though the pre-1914 period witnesses a series
of important achievements of federal institutions, most of these institutions still
exist, albeit with modifications, and it seems difficult to assign their productivity
impact to individual periods. One might speculate, whether those federal insti-
tutions have contributed to a higher productivity growth as compared with the
period before Germany’s foundation. But, afterwards the continuance of these
federal institutions might have caused an upward shift of productivity growth
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across all subperiods. Nevertheless, differences in productivity growth across
subperiods were still attributable to the development of public expenditures.
As for policy coordination, especially with regard to the post-World War II
period, the Federal Republic of Germany is, in contrast to American federalism,
characterized by complex connections between governments at all levels, which is
frequently referred to as “Politikverflechtung” (Scharpf et al., 1976). Given this
type of cooperative federalism, it can be argued that the close interrelationship
between governments at the federal, state, and local levels establish a “unitary
federation” (Hesse, 1962) which, in effect, operates like a single, albeit complex
polity. Blankart (1999a) identifies a “hidden centralization” process in Germany
resulting from the attempt of the La¨nder to use their power on most legislative
issues in the upper chamber of parliament, the Bundesrat, to create a revenue
cartel, mitigating horizontal competition.However, it should be noted that this
specific kind of horizontal cooperation is not equivalent to a centralization of
policies resulting in a higher share of federal public goods. Although the states
may use their constitutional position at the federal level to elicit funds and
to escape from the constraints of fiscal competition, it is not obvious why the
states should use their funds to actually supply federal public goods. Rather,
one should expect state governments to use their funds in their own interest,
even if the general legal framework for their policies is laid down centrally and
uniformly. In terms of the above model, states would use the funds to provide
local public goods, rather than federal public goods. In fact, as we will see in the
following section, the empirical analysis of the situation in the period after 1950
provides some support for the view that a reduction of the expenditure share of
the state level might actually have benefited growth.
4 Centralization and productivity growth after World
War II
This section examines whether in fact the vertical structure of the public sector
in today’s Germany is efficient with respect to overall productivity growth. The
years after 1990 are not included as they suffer from the structural break related
to re-unification.
The regression relates current productivity growth to lagged values of growth,
public spending and centralization. Formally, the basic estimation equation is
P̂t = β0 + β1P̂t−1 + β2Tt−1 + β3Θt−1 + β4t+ ut. (23)
P̂t denotes the rate of total factor productivity growth in period t, Tt−1 the ratio
of total public expenditures (exclusive of social insurance) as percentage of NNP,
and Θt−1 the share of federal government expenditures in total public expendi-
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Table 4: Estimated coefficients of the effects on productivity growth, 1950-1990
Dep. Variable: TFP growth rate
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Constant -0.250 -0.191 -0.471 -0.320 -0.239 -0.363 -0.215
(2.19) (1.48) (2.90) (2.38) (2.08) (2.72) (1.71)
TFP growth t−1 0.167 0.124 0.169 0.060 0.016 -0.000 0.118
(0.99) (0.71) (1.04) (0.34) (0.08) (0.00) (0.66)
Expenditures t−1 -0.043 -0.091 0.034 -0.456 -0.121 -0.430 -0.119
(0.26) (0.52) (0.21) (1.50) (0.65) (1.51) (0.61)
Federal exp. share t−1 0.557 0.461 0.832 0.521 0.883 0.512
(2.83) (2.10) (2.98) (2.61) (3.15) (2.42)
Ratio fed. to state exp. t−1 0.756
(3.31)
Educ. exp. t−1 0.713 0.766
(1.65) (1.81)
Federal educ. exp. share t−1 -0.325 -0.270
(1.57) (1.65)
Transp. exp. t−1 -0.290 -0.217
(1.34) (0.93)
Federal transp. exp. share t−1 0.153 0.080
(1.39) (0.84)
Trend 0.001 0.001 0.015 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001
(1.31) (1.38) (1.89) (1.22) (1.69) (2.10) (0.78)
Catching-up dummy 0.012
(0.99)
R2 0.344 0.363 0.388 0.401 0.394 0.417 0.364
R2adj. 0.267 0.267 0.216 0.289 0.280 0.308 0.245
BG (1) 1.26 1.01 1.90 0.27 0.02 0.01 1.25
BG (2) 1.36 1.73 1.78 4.33 1.60 4.26 1.70
Note: absolute value of t-statistics in brackets.
tures. If we allow for interactions between expenditures, centralization, and
productivity growth, corresponding equations could be stated for expenditure
and centralization pointing to an analysis along the lines of a vector autore-
gression framework. Thus, for example, productivity growth could have led to
rising income and, as a consequence, to higher public expenditures in response
to increasing demand for public goods and rising tax revenues. However, since
our focus is on the impact on productivity growth, we refrain from doing so here
and focus on the single aspect of Granger causality in one direction.20
Column (1) in Table 4 shows results from a basic regression including a lin-
20In this regard, the equation is a reduced form which neglects the contemporaneous relationship between the
variables. But, if we assume that the contemporaneous correlation between Tt, Θt, and P̂t is limited, the sign of
the effect of centralization on TFP can be interpreted as revealing the sign of the relationship in the structural
equation.
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ear trend. The estimation takes account of just one lag, since the inclusion of
higher order lags was rejected on grounds of the Akaike criterion. Note that the
Breusch/Godfrey (BG) tests allowing for 1 or 2 lags do not indicate the pres-
ence of residual autocorrelation. Moreover, checks for influential observations
following Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) did not detect any outliers. For a
given level of public expenditures, which turns out to be insignificant, the results
indicate a statistically significant positive effect of overall centralization on TFP
growth during this period, even though a trend is included. The estimation in
column (2) indicates that the effect of centralization is also robust against the
inclusion of a dummy for the post-war period (1950-55) capturing the catching-
up in the immediate post-war years. But, note that the dummy is not significant
and that the adjusted R2 is not increased. Note also that the inclusion of a cubic
trend (results not shown) did not alter the results for the level of expenditures
and centralization.
In light of the previous sections’ descriptive analysis, we should expect the pos-
itive impact of centralization to be related with the fiscal re-emergence of the
state level after the World War II. Therefore, column (3) replaces the federal
level’s expenditure share with an alternative indicator measuring the ratio of
federal to state spending leaving aside the spending of municipalities. As ex-
pected, the significant effect is still obtained. This suggests that a reduction of
the expenditure share of the state level would actually have benefited growth.
As the above discussion shed some light on specific policy areas, further re-
gressions use, in addition, the level and degree of centralization of spending on
education and science and on transport and communication (columns (4)-(7)).
The level of expenditures on education and science shows a weak significant pos-
itive effect. It is interesting to see that centralization has more likely a negative
sign: the negative effect of the federal expenditure share indicates that growth
might have been stronger with less rather than with more centralization. With
regard to the area of transport and communication the effects proved to be in-
significant. At best, the level of expenditures tends to have a negative effect,
whereas the impact of centralization is positive. Nevertheless, the share of con-
solidated federal expenditures shows a significant effect across all specifications,
indicating that productivity growth would have been larger with more federal
and less state level expenditures.
5 Summary and conclusion
The motivation of the paper has been to discuss whether public sector central-
ization might not only be a hard-to-avoid consequence but also a major force
of economic growth. This hypothesis has been laid out in a theoretical model
emphasizing the role of benefit spillovers from public inputs between lower level
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governments. It turned out that as compared to a setting without coordina-
tion among governments, a central planner’s solution would imply an increase
in spending on federal public goods which benefits total factor productivity and
also productivity growth, if the steady state supports ongoing economic growth.
The hypothesis of a stimulating role of centralization on productivity and pro-
ductivity growth has then been confronted with the historical record in Germany
from its foundation as a federal country in the 19th century until today. A re-
view of the development of the public sector, and, in particular, of the share of
federal government expenditures, as an indicator of the share of federal goods
supplied, in fact documents a significant secular process of centralization from
Germany’s foundation until the 1970’s. At the same time a significant increase
in productivity growth is indicated from growth accounting. Moreover, the slight
reduction of the federal expenditure share since the 1970’s is accompanied with
a significant lower rate of productivity growth. A co-movement of productivity
growth and centralization is also suggested by an inspection of specific policy
areas, which are commonly regarded as playing a particularly important role
for productivity growth. Whereas in the area of science and education the fed-
eral expenditure share still remained small, until the 1970’s public expenditures
on transport and communication have been incurred increasingly by the federal
level.
However, there are undoubtedly serious shortcomings of using the federal level’s
expenditure share as an indicator of the supply of federal goods. In particular,
budgetary statistics will tend to underestimate the scope of legal and regulative
government activities. There is some indication that especially in the early peri-
ods of the German federation significant coordination was achieved by new fed-
eral legislation and regulation. But, as many of those federal institutions still ex-
ist, they might simply have caused an upward shift of productivity growth across
all subperiods, and, consequently, differences in productivity growth across sub-
periods are still attributable to the development of public expenditures.
In addition, as the figures on productivity growth are obtained from growth ac-
counting they should be used with considerable caution, all the more so, as the
historical data material is far from incontestable. Therefore, the small difference
in productivity growth before and after the foundation of Germany as a federal
state of about 0.2 % is too small to justify recommendations for policies in the
context of European integration. But, the co-movement of productivity growth
and centralization is not confined to the early periods and, although only in a
stepwise fashion, extends over a long period until the mid of the 1970’s. Hence,
although the descriptive evidence is not revealing the direction of causation, it
can be stated that the pattern in the development of the public sector and of pro-
ductivity is consistent with a stimulating impact of centralization on economic
growth. However, with the strongest increase in the federal share of the public
sector taking place in the Nazi period, the data are also revealing the drawback
of centralization: in presence of a non-benevolent central planner centralization
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can yield immense welfare losses.
In a second step of the analysis the relationship between centralization and
productivity growth in Germany after World War II has been empirically inves-
tigated by means of regression analysis. This approach allows us to distinguish
effects of the size of the public sector from effects of its vertical structure and
from the general trend in productivity growth. The results confirm a significant
impact of the federal expenditure share on productivity growth after World War
II. This suggests that a higher share of federal expenditures or, respectively, a
smaller share of the state level, would have led to even higher rates of produc-
tivity growth. This finding is, however, not related to the federal expenditure
share in education and science or in transport and communication. Whereas
centralization in the latter area showed a weak positive effect on growth and a
weak negative effect in the case of education and science, the overall degree of
centralization proved significant throughout all specifications.
Since fiscal federalism in Germany after World War II is characterized by com-
plex connections between governments at all fiscal tiers, a higher share of federal
public goods supplied may not only be brought about by higher federal expen-
ditures but also by means of coordination among jurisdictions. As the analysis
nonetheless shows a positive significance of federal government expenditures or,
respectively, a negative significance of state government expenditures, it, there-
fore, indicates that the coordination of policies among state level governments
as part of the cooperative federalism is not efficient with regard to productiv-
ity growth. Indeed, the negative impact found for the state level expenditures
might be interpreted as an indication that the current role of the state level in
the German system of fiscal federalism is inefficient. If state level governments
are forming a revenue cartel (Blankart, 1999a) one might even argue that a step
towards higher fiscal autonomy is beneficial for growth if it reduces an oversupply
of local public goods resulting from a swelled state level budget.
Of course, by focusing on efficiency with regard to productivity the current study
has excluded many other possible government objectives. If state governments
as compared to the federal government are more involved with the provision of
public services other than public inputs, the current vertical division of respon-
sibilities might well be efficient with respect to other objectives. However, given
frequent criticism about disincentives of the German system of fiscal federalism,
it seems nevertheless important to state that, whatever the objectives are, ac-
cording to the empirical results the current structure of the public sector entails
cost in the sense of foregone productivity growth.
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Quantification of productivity growth
A standard macroeconomic approach to quantify productivity growth is provided by the tech-
nique of growth accounting. TFP growth is measured by the residual difference between the rate
of change in real output (net national product at factor costs)21 and a weighted average of the
growth rates of the total volume of worked hours as well as of capital input, where the weights
are the income shares of labor and capital (for an overview see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995).
Like other studies (Hesse and Gahlen, 1965, Andre, 1971), the analysis of the period up to
World War II draws heavily on the work of Hoffmann (1965) which, despite of some statistical
deficiencies, comprises the most consistent and detailed compendium of historical data for the
case of Germany.22 Even if alternative statistics are available for the inter-war period, e.g. from
the Statistisches Bundesamt (1972), the growth accounting is continued with Hoffmann’s more
complete data. Only specific figures are taken from more recent sources, see data sources below.
For the inter-war period, where the capacity utilization of capital fluctuated considerably the
utilization rate as calculated by Mester (1961) is taken into account. For the period after World
War II the analysis relies mainly on the official publications of the Statistisches Bundesamt.
Although in principle a disaggregation of capital and labor might be possible for this period,
we refrain from doing so here because, then, the consistency with regard to previous periods
would no longer be ensured. However, due to the residual approach the measure of TFP growth
migth overestimate productivity growth.23 Nevertheless, since the aim of this study is not to
quantify exactly the level of productivity growth, but to relate its development with developments
in public sector activity, it seems justified to use this measure, especially since no reasonable
alternative is available.
Data sources and definitions
Territory
1850-1913 – Germany, frontiers of 1913 (until 1870 without Elsass-Lothringen)
1925-1938 – Germany, frontiers of 1925 (without Austria and Sudetenland, since 1934 with Saarland)
1950-1997 – FRG, until 1990 without GDR (until 1959 also without Saarland and West Berlin)
Net domestic product, net national product
1850-1938 – Hoffmann (1965), NNP at market prices and at factor costs, in current prices, NDP at factor
costs in current and constant prices as of 1913.
1950-1997 – Stat. Bundesamt (1991a, 1998a), NNP at market prices and at factor costs, in current and
constant prices as of 1985, GNP deflator.
Capital stock
1850-1913 – Hoffmann (1965), constant prices as of 1913.
21For reasons of comparability, the net product is employed for the entire period until today, since no direct
statistics on gross product are available before 1913, but only different estimations, such as Ritschl and Spoerer
(1997), or Andic and Veverka (1963). Furthermore, for the period 1850-1938 only data on the net domestic
product at factor costs are available in constant prices.
22For a critical discussion of Hoffmann and other German national accounts of this time see Holtfrerich (1983),
Fremdling (1988), Kuczynski (1967), Meihsl (1967), Lampert (1968) and Stolper (1969).
23For a detailed discussion of the growth accounting methodology and the problems encountered in measuring
TFP, see e.g. Solow (1957), Denison (1962, 1967), Christensen et al. (1980), Griliches (1998), Barro (1998),
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), and Jorgenson and Griliches (1967, 1995).
28
1925-1938 – Hoffmann (1965), in constant prices as of 1913. Capital utilization rate, Mester (1961).
1950-1997 – Statistisches Bundesamt (1991c, 1997), in constant prices as of 1985.
Capital income share
1850-1913 – Hoffmann (1965), capital income share in NDP.
1925-1938 – Petzina et al. (1978), capital income share in NNP.
1950-1997 – Statistisches Bundesamt (1991a, 1998a), share of gross income from entrepreneurship and
property in NNP.
Population
1850-1913 – Hoffmann (1965).
1925-1938 – Hoffmann (1965).
1950-1997 – Statistisches Bundesamt (1991a, 1998a).
Employment
1850-1913 – Hoffmann (1965), employed persons.
1925-1938 – Gattinger (1961), employed persons.
1950-1997 – Statistisches Bundesamt (1991a, 1998a), employed persons.
Working hours (annual average per employed person)
1850-1913 – Hoffmann (1965), interpolated figures.
1925-1938 – Maddison (1995), interpolated figures.
1950-1997 – IAB (1992, 1997) and Statistisches Bundesamt (1998c), until 1960 extrapolated.
Labor income share
1850-1913 – Hoffmann (1965), labor income share in NDP (incl. income of self-employed).
1925-1938 – Petzina et al. (1978), labor income share in NNP (income of employees).
1950-1997 – Stat. Bundesamt (1991a, 1998a), labor income share in NNP (income of employees).
Total public expenditures as percentage of net national product (at market prices)
1850-1938 – Hoffmann (1965), total public expenditures without social insurance: public consumption,
current transfers and interest payments, net public investment (without railways and postal services).
1950-1997 – Statistisches Bundesamt (1991b) and Sachversta¨ndigenrat (1998), total public expenditures
without social insurance, “Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung” (VGR).
Allocation of total public expenditures by fiscal tiers
1881-1938 – Andic and Veverka (1963), public expenditures without social insurance, incomplete series.
1950-1997 – Stat. Bundesamt (1972, 1998b), net public expenditures without social insurance and
payments to the EU, incl. special funds LAF and ERP, “Finanzstatistik“.
Public expenditures for transport and communication
1881-1935 – level: Weitzel (1968), Recktenwald (1962, 1975); by fiscal tiers: Statistisches Bundesamt
(1972); incomplete series.
1950-1997 – Statistisches Bundesamt (1972, 1998b), net expenditures, “Finanzstatistik”.
Public expenditures for education and science
1881-1937 – level: Hoffmann (1965); by fiscal tiers: Statistisches Bundesamt (1972); incomplete series.
1950-1997 – Statistisches Bundesamt (1972, 1998b), net expenditures, “Finanzstatistik”.
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